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Criminal Law-Requisites for Forfeiture of Vehicles Transporting
Liquor in Violation of Law
From the early common law, the courts have lent added efforts to
the cause of deterring violations of the criminal law by providing for con-
demnation and forfeiture of various instrumentalities used in the com-
mission of crime. Today the Congress and the State Legislatures have,
for the most part, adopted this policy by providing for forfeiture of vari-
ous instrumentalities used in commission of crime as a specific penalty
thereof. However, as a general rule, the legislative adoptions of the
common law policy of forfeiture differ from the common law in one im-
portant respect: American Jurisprudence' points out that "forfeiture in
many cases of felony did not attach at the early English common law
where the proceeding was in rem until the offender was convicted."
But, "the ancient doctrine requiring conviction of a personal offender
does not apply to seizure and forfeiture created by statutes in rem, for
the reason that the thing in such case is primarily considered as the
offender or rather that the offense is attached primarily to the thing. ... "
The practical importance of such a distinction may be illustrated in
this manner: a culprit is engaged in violation of the state law by trans-
porting non-tax paid liquor in an automobile. Upon being overtaken by
law enforcement officers, the culprit determines discretion to be the better
part of valor, abandons the automobile and its cargo and flees to safety.
The officers are thus left with an automobile which is clearly being
used in violation of the criminal law, but with no criminal defendant. It
will be observed that under the common law, it would not be possible to
proceed against the automobile in this case since there is no criminal
defendant, but that under the in rem statutory type proceeding the ab-
sence of a criminal defendant would not be fatal.
In North Carolina the above illustration apparently occurs quite fre-
quently. Although N. C. has a Statute providing for forfeiture of auto-
mobiles used in illegal transportation of liquor, uncertainty of its applica-
tion to this type of situation has created something of a hiatus in the
law, with attendant confusion on the part of law enforcement officers.3
G. S. § 18-6 provides in part as follows:
123 Am. JUR., Forfeitures and Penalties § 6 (1939). Dobbins's Distillery v.
United States, 96 U. S. 395, 399 (1877) ; Various items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U. S. 577, 580 (1931).
'United States v. The Ruth Mildred, 286 U. S. 67, 69 (1932) ; Commonwealth
v. Certain Motor Vehicle, 261 Mass. 504, 508, 159 N. E. 613, 614 (1928).
Based on numerous inquiries directed to the Institute of Government, Chapel
Hill, N. C., from Law Enforcement Officers. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 18-6 appears to be
the only statute in N. C. which provides for a judicial forfeiture of articles used in
the commission of crime as a specific penalty thereof.
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"When any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act
of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquor in any
* . .automobile ... or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize
any and all intoxicating liquor found therein . .. he shall take
possession of the vehicle ... and shall arrest any person in charge
thereof. Such officer shall at once proceed against the person
arrested.., said vehicle.., shall be returned to owner upon exe-
cution by him of a good and valid bond ... to return said prop-
erty to the custody of said official on the day of trial to abide the
Judgment of the court. All liquor seized under this section shall
be held and shall upon the acquittal of the person so charged be
returned to established owner, and shall within ten days of con-
viction. . . be destroyed ... unless the claimant can show that the
property seized is his property, and that the same was used in
transporting liquor without his knowledge and consent . . .The
court shall order a sale by public auction of the property seized."
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has not had occasion
for a direct holding on whether G. S.§ 18-6 would authorize the state to
proceed directly against the automobile in the absence of a conviction of
the criminal defendant, there is dicta which gives a strong indication
that the state cannot do so. In State v. Maynor4 where the defendant
had been convicted of illegal transportation of non-tax paid liquor it was
held that the court may at a subsequent term enter an order nunc pro
tunc for the forfeiture and sale of the vehicle used for such transporta-
tion under G. S. § 18-6. The court then said, "The order of condemna-
tion and sale of the vehicle seized is perforce no part of the personal
judgment against the accused, albeit both are dependent upon his con-
viction."5  (Italics added.) Then in a later case 6 the court ruled that
where the jury had found the defendant guilty of transporting non-tax
paid liquor and where defendant had admitted ownership, "all the
essential facts necessary to authorize confiscation of defendant's auto-
mobile were before the court."' 7
Whether this interpretation of G. S. § 18-6 is right or wrong such
language has necessitated the storing of each car involved in the situation
where it has not been possible to proceed against the driver, with the
result that there are many cars stored in North Carolina today with in
rem proceedings made impossible by such interpretation.
It is of interest to contrast the language of G. S. § 18-6 with that of
other federal and state statutes relating to condemnation and forfeiture
'226 N. C. 645, 39 S. E. 2d 833 (1946).
Id. at 646, 39 S. E. 2d at 834.
C State v. Vanhoy, 230 N. C. 162, 52 S. E. 2d 278 (1949).
7Id. at 165, 52 S. E. 2d at 280.
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proceedings. For instance 18 United States Code § 3618 states "any
conveyance, whether used by the owner or another in introducing or at-
tempting to introduce intoxicants into the Indian country or into other
places where the introduction is prohibited by treaty or enactment of
Congress, shall be subject to seizure, libel and forfeiture." In United
States v. One Chevrolet Coupe,8 the court interpreting the statute, held
automobiles used to introduce intoxicating liquors into Indian country
may be seized and forfeited regardless of the owner's innocence. "It is
the automobile itself that is the offender and it is immaterial what the cir-
cumstances are."
Similar language is found in 46 United States Code § 325 dealing
with licensed vessels: "whenever any licensed vessel . . . is employed in
any trade whereby the revenue of the United States is defrauded ... or
found with merchandise of foreign growth . . . or any taxable domestic
spirits, wines, or other alcoholic liquors, on which the duties or taxes
have not been paid or secured to be paid, such vessel with her tackle,
apparel and furniture, and the cargo, found on board shall be forfeited."
In United States v. The Ruth Mildred,'° the court held that for breach
of the navigation laws under 46 United States Code § 325 the proceedings
are strictly in rem and are not dependent upon a preliminary adjudica-
tion of personal guilt.
United States v. 25 Packages of Panama Hats,"' was a proceeding
to forfeit, for fraud of foreign consignors, goods not technically entered
at the New York Customshouse. The Tariff Act 12 declared, "That if any
consignor . . . shall enter . . . into the commerce of the United States
any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice,
or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission ... whereby ... United
States . . : shall ... be deprived of lawful duties, such merchandise ...
shall be forfeited. . . ." The Court held that there is no inconsistency
in proceeding against the res if the wrongdoer is beyond the jurisdiction
of the court. The very fact that the criminal provision of the statute does
not operate extra-territorially against the consignor, would be a reason
why the goods themselves should be subjected to forfeiture on arrival
here. The consignor's absence would not relieve the goods from the
liability to be forfeited.' 3 There are other cases to the same effect.' 4
8 58 F. 2d 235 (9th Cir. 1932).
OId. at 236.10286 U. S. 67 (1932).
1231 U. S. 358 (1913).
"Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, 36 Stat. 11, 97 Repealed, 38 Stat. 201 (1913).
"231 U. S. at 362.
"In an early federal case the property seized was a distillery in the hands of a
lessee. The acts of the lessee with intent to defeat the revenue were unknown to
the owner. Nevertheless it was held that the distillery was subject to forfeiture.
The court said: "A forfeiture proceeding under R. S. § 3257 or 3281 is in rem.
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It may be noted that in the above statutes there has been no mention
of prior conviction of the defendant before forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted, and likewise the courts have not construed them as demand-
ing such conviction. This type of statute is not confined to the federal
codes, but may be found in many state statutes. A Kansas statuteI
states, "If the court shall find that said intoxicating liquors or other
property . . . being used in maintaining a common nuisance, he shall
adjudge forfeited so much thereof as he shall find was being so used...."
In State v. McManus'0 it was argued by defendant that before the prop-
erty could be seized and condemned under this statute there must be a
conviction of the person who unlawfully used such property. The court
in its opinion categorically said, "we don't agree." "The property so
kept and used is tried in a proceeding in rem, regardless of whether there
has been an arrest or conviction of the person charged with maintaining
such place."'17 It was also pointed out in this case that this was the
practice in the courts of the United States where goods have been for-
feited for non-payment of customs revenues.' 8
The code of Virginia'0 states, "if such illegally acquired alcoholic
beverages . . . be found therein . . . shall seize the same, and shall also
seize and take possession of such conveyance or vehicle and deliver the
same.. . to the sheriff of the county ... taking receipt therefor.... The
officer making such seizure shall also arrest all persons found in charge
of such vehicle . . . within ten days after receiving notice of any such
seizure, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall file in the name of the
Commonwealth, any information against the seized property.... Such
information shall allege the seizure and set forth in general terms the
grounds of forfeiture of the seized property, and shall pray that the
same be condemned and sold .... " In Ives v. Commonwealth20 the court
held that a proceeding under this section to have an automobile con-
demned and sold because of a violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Act is a proceeding in rem rather than in personam and is a civil
It is the property which is proceeded against and by resort to a legal fiction, held
guilty and condemned as though it were conscious, instead of inanimate and insenti-
ent. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded
against, convicted and punished. The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for
the criminal offense." Dobbins Distillery v. U. S. 96 U. S. 395 (1877). Similar lan-
guage may be found in a later federal case brought in a libel proceeding under the
internal revenue laws. The court held that the dismissal of the criminal actioh
does not bar the libel proceeding against the vehicle. Sneed v. U. S., 217 F. 2d 912
(4th cir. 1954).
"
5 KAN. GEN. STAT. § 2496 (1942).
1865 Kan. 720, 70 Pac. 700 (1902).
' Id. at 725, 70 Pac. at 701.
': Origet v. United States, 125 U. S. 240 (1888).
"VA. Co, ANN. § 4-56 (1950).
.0 182 Va. 17, 27 S. E. 2d 906 (1943).
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action against an automobile and not a criminal action against a person.
South Carolina and Tennessee have statutes similar in effect. 21
It has been suggested above that the North Carolina Court will not
construe G. S. § 18-6 as allowing forfeiture proceedings before criminal
conviction of the defendant as the above federal and state courts have
done.
One clue to our court's interpretation of G. S. § 18-6 may be found in
the Federal Courts construction of § 26 of the National Prohibition Act 22
which our act very closely follows. It provided "when the commissioner
*.. shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the
law, intoxicating liquors in any ... automobile . . . or other vehicle, it
shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein
... he shall take possession of the vehicle ... and arrest the person in
charge thereof. Such officer shall at once proceed against the person ar-
rested . .. but the said vehicle shall be returned to the owner upon
execution by him of a good and valid bond... and to return said prop-
erty to custody of said officer on the day of the trial to abide the judg-
ment of the court. The court upon conviction of the person so arrested
shall order the liquor destroyed, and unless good cause to contrary is
shown by the owner, shall order a sale by public auction of property
seized." In construing this statute the court in United States v.
Shtsser23 held, to authorize the forfeiture of a vehicle as having been
used for illegal transportation of liquor under this section, the person
in charge must previously have been arrested and convicted. And in the
case of "The J. Dutffy"2 4 the court said under this section, "conviction
of the person in charge of a vehicle, or the master of a vessel, seized
while being used for this illegal transportation of liquor, is a condition
precedent to the forfeiture of the vehicle or vessel. And in United States
v. The Ruth Mildred25 the court in distinguishing 46 United States Code
§ 325 from § 26 of the National Prohibition Act said that in the former
statute her guilt was not affected, was neither enlarged or diminished,
by the fact that the cargo happened to be one of intoxicating liquor.
The government made out a case of forfeiture when there was proof that
the cargo was other than fish. "Forfeiture under § 26 of The National
Prohibition Act is one of the consequences of a successful criminal prose-
cution of a personal offender, and is ancillary thereto. While forfeiture
under 46 United States Code § 325 for breach of navigation laws is
strictly in rem and is not dependent upon a preliminary adjudication of
personal guilt.' ' 26
2 S. C. CODE LAWS §§ 4-11, 4-115 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-622 (1955).
.' 27 USCA § 40. Repealed 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
-270 Fed. 818 (S. D. Ohio 1921). 2 F. 2d 426 (D. Conn. 1926).
25 286 U. S. 67 (1932).
20 Id. at 69.
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Thus the similarity between the two statutes and the respective cases
construing same are clearly evident.
While it might be possible for our court to decide that G. S. § 18-6
does allow direct proceedings against the automobile in the absence of
arrest and conviction of the criminal offender without doing violence to
the language of the act, a literal reading of the statute seems clearly to
lead to a contrary conclusion. There is, however, language in G. S. § 18-6
which could be seized upon to support condemnation and forfeiture pro-
ceedings without arrest and conviction. That language is "if no one
shall be found claiming the ... vehicle, the taking of the same with a
description thereof, shall be advertized in some newspaper ... and if no
claimant shall appear within ten days after the last publication . . . the
-property shall be sold.. .. "
However, to interpret the above language as allowing condemnation
and forfeiture proceedings without prior arrest and conviction of the
culprit would be to take it out of context. For unlike many Federal
statutes, G. S. § 18-6 protects the rights of innocent owners and creditors
in the offending property. This section of the statute immediately pre-
cedes the above language, "and the officer . . . after deducting the ex-
penses of keeping the property . . . shall pay all liens . . . which are
established . . . and as having been created without the lienor having
any notice that the carrying vehicle was being used for illegal transporta-
tion of liquor .... All liens against property sold under the provisions
of this section shall be transferred from the property to the proceeds
of the sale of the property: if however no one shall be found claiming...."
Thus the entire meaning of the phrase beginning "if no one shall be
found claiming" is in all probability referring to the absence of a claimant
as distinguished from the absence of a driver or criminal defendant.
Therefore in view of the literal language of the statute, and the in-
terpretation given an almost identical federal statute, by the federal
courts, the dicta found in the several North Carolina cases 27 suggesting
that condemnation and forfeiture proceedings under G. S. § 18-6 are de-
pendent upon arrest and conviction of the criminal offender seem sound.
Inasmuch as the offense of violating the liquor law must be proved
prior to a forfeiture of the vehicle under either the typical in rem pro-
ceeding or the proceeding subsequent to the criminal conviction as con-
templated by G. S. § 18-6, it would seem that either statutory policy
proceeds upon an equal regard of the rights of owners.28 For under the
27 State v. Maynor, 226 N. C. 645, 39 S. E. 2d 833 (1946) ; State v. Vanhoy, 230
N. C. 162, 52 S. E. 2d 278 (1949).28 However, it might be noted that one difference between the two proceedings is
that under the in rem proceedings only the civil burden of proof, a preponderance
of the evidence, would be necessary to sustain a forfeiture, while under N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 18-6, assuming a conviction of the criminal defendant is necessary for for-
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present interpretation of our statute, a fleeing culprit may not only
escape criminal conviction, but also might ultimately regain possession
of his automobile.
Thus the writer suggests that the legislature take cognizance of the
various questions raised from the language of G. S. § 18-6 and the ulti-
mate confusion resulting therefrom, with a view towards clarification, or
better still an adherence to what seems to be the general trend toward
allowing condemnation and forfeiture proceedings without regard to
prior arrest and convictions of the criminal defendant.
THOMAS C. CREASY, JR.
Evidence-Admissibility of Truth Serum Test Results
The Truth Serum Test1 has received practically no judicial recogni-
tion since its recent debut into the truth discovery field. The results of
this test, usually taken voluntarily by the accused, 2 have continually
been excluded by the courts primarily because statements or confessions
made while examinees are under the influence of such drugs as sodium
amytal and sodium pentothol are (1) unreliable,3 (2) self-serving or
feiture, the required burden of proof to support forfeiture is proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
I This term has been frequently applied even though actually misleading, for the
drugs are neither serum, nor do they always produce the "empirical" truth. After
the drug is injected, the patient falls into a state of partial consciousness (twi-
light sleep) and becomes susceptible to interrogation until recovery which usually
requires several hours. The drug eliminates repressive influences and ordinary
restraints which under normal conditions lead to embarrassment and fear. Halluci-
nations in some instances have occurred. After recovery the patient is said to
have no recollection of the transpired interview. The technical label for such an
examination is narcoanalysis. Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug- -
duced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L. J. 315 (1953) ; Muehl-
berger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 513 (1951).
'Assuming defendant confesses during drug-induced interview to which he
voluntarily submits, no claim of self-incrimination would bar such confession from
evidence; however, such confessions are at present deemed unreliable, and hence,
inadmissible. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 841 (a) (1940). Evidence obtained from
these interviews or from clues tendered therein, most likely would be admissible
as would confessions given after presentation of test results to the examinee. Note,
62 YALE L. J. 315, 337 (1953) ; STANSBURY, EVIDENCE, § 186 (1946). Tests taken
involuntarily must necessarily raise issues of self-incrimination and illegally ob-
tained confessions. Such confessions will of course be held inadmissible when ex-
tracted while examinee is under the influence of injected drugs. Whether evidence
discovered in such interview or whether confessions induced by test results would
be held admissible will depend upon the laws applicable to particular jurisdictions
in question. Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHI. L.
REV. 601 (1946). See, Note 32 N. C L. REv. 98 (1954); 3 WVmmaOam, EvmiE NE§ 859 (1940) ; SrANSBURY, EVIDENCE §§ 182-86 (1946). In regard to due process
see Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REV. 683
(1955).
'State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 158, 285 P. 2d 612 (1955) ; State v. Lindemuth, 56
N. M. 257, 243 P. 2d 325 (1952) ; Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P. 2d
495 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 898 (1951). See notes 62 YALE L. J. 315
(1953); 46 J. Cii. L., C. & P. S. 259 (1956); annot., 23 A. L. R. 2d 1306
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